

## &lt;前回&gt;オリエンテーション

前期：キリスト教と近代的知

後期：方法論的考察と聖書の社会論

オリエンテーション

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**I：象徴・言語・システム****1. 象徴・言語 1****(1) カントとドイツ古典哲学の課題（前期）**

1. 近代的知（啓蒙主義的合理性）とキリスト教的伝統の新しい関係構築、自律と他律の二分法を超えた知的世界の形成。

- ・ 浅薄な知性主義への迎合・同化ではなく。理神論的ネオロギー的キリスト教批判。
- ・ 頑迷な伝統主義の超合理主義でもなく。

↓

宗教の固有性と合理性の確立

それに従った、知の再編（原理と体系）

2. 合理主義的神論から哲学的人間学・宗教論へ。カントとシュライアマハーの宗教哲学。

3. カント主義の諸潮流 Ernst Troeltsch, Zur Frage des religiösen Apriori.

**(2) 哲学的象徴論——自然／文化／宗教**

4. Ernst Cassirer, *Philosophie der symbolischen Formen, Erster Teil. Die Sprache*, 1923.

5. 哲学的象徴論

波多野精一『宗教哲学』（1935）、『宗教哲学序論』（1940）、『時と永遠』（1943）

### (3) 言語哲学と象徴論

#### 6. リクール

象徴：Logos / Bios

#### 7. Paul Tillich, "Das religiöse Symbol (1928)," in: *MainWorks*. 4, pp.213-228.

(芦名定道「パウル・ティリッヒと象徴の問題」、『基督教学研究』(京都大学基督教学会)、第7号、1984年、78-92頁。)

Uneigentlichkeit：象徴における内的行為の意図、象徴と象徴されているもの

象徴素材とその固有の本来の意味と象徴的意味 → 象徴と記号  
の意味構造

Anschaulichkeit：象徴の具象性・具体的直観性、形態化。

Selbstmächtigkeit：参与(participation)、記号(恣意的、規約的)との差異。

Anerkennung：社会的次元

#### 8. *Dynamics of Faith* (1957), in: *MainWorks*. 5. pp.231-290.

Symbols of Faith

point beyond

participate

open up

grow out of the individual or collective unconscious

#### 9. 意味と形態(言語論から実在論)、存在論、社会的次元(現実化の諸条件と機能)

↓

意味と指示、指示の二重性。批判的実在論と宗教(宗教経験)

### <概論講義より>

#### (1) 媒介機能の二つの次元

①意味の媒介 → 言語(ラング、パロール)

体系性：記号体系内における諸記号との関係(差異性) → 記号論

「意味は実体ではなく関係である」

恣意性： → 正当化の問題

歴史性：メッセージ・了解・伝承 → 解釈学

多義性：

②力の媒介(効果)

意識・無意識・感性・身体の諸レベルへの効果 → 説得力

#### (2) 力・作用・効果の媒介の二つのレベル

③心理的レベル → 現実開示(意味の発見)と心の開示

ex) 芸術、美的経験

心の統合機能(→精神分析)

④共同体的レベル

共同体の統合 → 統合・排除の二重性（境界設定）

(3) 聖なるものの経験・ヒエロファニー（経験と象徴表現の相互関連・循環性）

← → 究極的関心・生の形態化

→ 教義・思想・観念・体系 → 倫理・実践

ブックガイド

- 1: 池上嘉彦 『記号論への招待』（岩波新書）
- 2: 森 哲郎 他編『経験と言語』（大明堂）
- 3: 島菌 進 他編『宗教のことば』（〃）
- 4: リクール 『聖書解釈学』（ヨルダン社）
- 5: 長谷正當 『象徴と想像力』（創文社）
- 6: 丸山圭三郎 『言葉と無意識』『言葉・狂気・エロス』（講談社現代新書）  
『カオスモスの運動』（講談社学術文庫）
- 7: 並木浩一 『旧約聖書における文化と人間』（教文館）
- 8: ソンターク 『隠喩としての病』（みすず書房）
- 9: 宮本・山本・大貫 『聖書の言葉を超えて ソクラテス・イエス・グノーシス』（東京大学出版会）
- 10: 立川健二・山田広昭 『現代言語論』（新曜社）

## 2. 象徴・言語 2

Paul Ricoeur, *Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning*, The Texas Christian University Press, 1976.

### 1. Language as Discourse

Langue and Parole: The Structural Model

Semantics versus Semiotics: The Sentence

The Dialectic of Event and Meaning

Discourse as Event

Discourse as Predication

Dialectics of Event and Meaning

Utterer's Meaning and Utterance Meaning

The Self-Reference of Discourse

Locutionary and Illocutionary Act

The Interlocutionary Act

Meaning as "Sense" and "Reference"

Some Hermeneutical Implication

### 2. Speaking and Writing

### 3. Metaphor and Symbol

### 4. Explanation and Understanding

Conclusion

・ リクールの言語論の展開：象徴論→隠喩論→テキスト解釈学（1960年代～1970年代）

*La métaphor vive*, Seuil, 1975.

"Biblical Hermeneutics (*Semeia*. 4, the Society of Biblical Literature)," 1975, pp.27-148.

## < Language as Discourse >

### 1. Langue and Parole: The Structural Model

Yet if the term are modern, the problem itself is not a new one. (1)

Language here then means something other than the general capacity to speak or the common competence of speaking. It designates the particular structure of the particular linguistic system.

With the words "structure" and "system" a new problematic emerges which tends, at least initially, to postpone, if not cancel, the problem of discourse, (2)

The withdrawal of the problem of discourse in the contemporary study of language is the price we must pay for the tremendous achievements brought about by the famous *Cours de linguistique général* of the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure. (2) His work relies on a fundamental distinction between language as *langue* and as *parole*, ... *Langue* is the code --- or the set of codes --- on the basis of which a particular speaker produces *parole* as a particular message,

A message is individual, its code is collective.

A message is a temporal event in the succession of events which constitute the diachronic dimension of time, while the code is in time as a set of contemporaneous elements, i.e., as a synchronic system. A message is intentional. ... The code is anonymous and not intended.

More than anything else, a message is arbitrary and contingent, while a code is systematic and compulsory for a given speaking community. (3)

Extension of the structural model concerns us directly insofar as the structural model was applied to the same categories of texts that are the object of our interpretation theory. Originally the model concerned units smaller than the sentence.

A decisive extension occurred, however, with the application of the structural model to linguistic entities larger than the sentence and also to non-linguistic entities similar to the texts of linguistic communication.

the treatment of folktales by the Russian formalists such as V. Propp  
myths by Claude Lévi-Strauss

Charles S. Peirce. Linguistics here becomes one province of the general theory of signs, albeit a province that has the privilege of being both one species and the paradigmatic example of a sign-system. (4)

the structural model as a model

First, a synchronic approach must precede any diachronic approach because systems are intelligible than changes. At best, a change is a partial or a global change in a state of system. Therefore the history of changes must come after the theory that describes the synchronic states of the system.

Second, the paradigmatic case for a structural approach is that of a finite set of discrete entities. in the combinatory capacity and the quasi-algebraic possibilities pertaining to such sets.

Third, in such a system no entity belonging to the structure of the system has a meaning of its own; the meaning of a word, for example, results from its opposition to the other lexical units of

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the same system. As Saussure said, in a system of signs there are only differences, but no substantial existence.

Fourth, in such finite systems, all the relations are immanent to the system. In this sense, semiotic systems are "closed," i.e., without relations to external, non-semiotic reality. (5)

the sign is defined by an aspects are the signifier ... and the signified --- the differential value in the lexical system.

The last postulate alone suffices to characterize structuralism as a global mode of thought, ... Language no longer appears as a mediation between minds and things. It constitutes a world of its own, within which each item only refers to other items of the same system, thanks to the interplay of oppositions and differences constitutive of the system. ... as a self-sufficient system of inner relationships. (6)

## 2. Semantics versus Semiotics: The Sentence

I want to oppose a two dimensional approach for which language relies on two irreducible entities, signs and sentences, (6)

The object of semiotics --- the sign --- is merely virtual.

The sentence is not a larger or more complex word, it is a new entity.... A sentence is made up of signs, but is not itself a sign.

Each stage requires new structures and a new description.

Emile Benveniste: language relies on the possibility of two kinds of operations, integration into larger wholes, and dissociation into constitutive parts. The sense proceeds from the first operation, the form from the second. (7)

Semiotics, the science of signs, is formal to the extent that it relies on the dissociation of language into constitutive parts. Semantics, the science of the sentence, is immediately concerned with the concept of the sense ... to the extent that semantics is fundamentally defined by the integrative procedures of language.

For me, the distinction between semantics and semiotics is the key to the whole problem of language, (8)

## 3. The Dialectic of Event and Meaning

the convergence of several approaches

All these partial achievements will be gathered under a common title, the dialectic of event and meaning in discourse, (8)

### *Discourse as Event*

Saussurean distinction between *langue* and *parole*

discourse is the event of language

Events vanish while systems remain.

to rectify this epistemological weakness of parole ... by relating it to the ontological priority of discourse resulting from the actuality of the event as opposed to the mere virtuality of the system.

this temporal existence of the message testifies to its actuality. The system in fact does not

exist. ... discourse grounds the very existence of language since only the discrete and each time unique acts of discourse actualize the code.

### ***Discourse as Predication***

the sentence ... a single distinctive trait: it has a predicate.

the theorists of ordinary language.

on the basis of the antithesis between predicate and subject.

The subject picks out something single --- Peter, London, this table, the fall of Rome, the first man ... --- by means of several grammatical devices which serve this logical function: proper names, pronouns, demonstratives, ... ,and "definite descriptions"(the so and so). What they all have in common is that they all identify one and only one item. (10) The predicate, in contrast, designates a kind of quality, a class of things, a type of relation, or a type of action.

This fundamental polarity between singular identification and universal predication gives a specific content to the notion of the proposition conceived of as the object of the speech event.

Discourse .... it is a structure in the synthetic sense, i.e., as the intertwining and interplay of the functions of identification and predication in one and the same sentence.

### ***Dialectics of Event and Meaning***

Discourse considered as either an event or a proposition, that is, as a predicative function combined with an identification, is an abstraction, which depends upon the concrete whole that is the dialectical unity of the event and meaning in the sentence. (11)

If all discourse is actualized as an event, all discourse is understood as meaning. By meaning or sense I here designate the propositional content,

If language is a *meinen*, an intending, it is so precisely due to this *Aufhebung* through which the event is cancelled as something merely transient and retained as the same meaning. (12)

## **4. Utterer's Meaning and Utterance Meaning**

### ***The Self-Reference of Discourse***

The concept of meaning allows two interpretations which reflect the main dialectic between event and meaning. To mean is both what the speaker means, i.e., what he intends to say, and what the sentence means, i.e., what the conjunction between the identification function and the predicative function yields. Meaning , in other words, is both noetic and noematic.

The event is somebody speaking. (12)

Languages do not speak, people do.

Discourse therefore has many substitutable ways of referring back to its speaker.

we are able to give a nonpsychological, because purely semantic, definition of the utterer's meaning. No mental entity need be hypothesized or hypostazised. The utterance meaning points back towards the utterer's meaning thanks to the self-reference of discourse to itself as an event.

(13)

### ***Locutionary and Illocutionary Act***

linguistic analysis ... of "speech act." J.L.Austin was the first to notice that "performatives" --- such as promises --- imply a specific commitment by the speaker who *does* what he says in

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saying it. ... This "doing" of the saying may be assimilated to the event pole...

all of them, besides saying something (the locutionary act), do something in saying (the illocutionary act), and yield effects *by* saying (the perlocutionary act). (14)

### ***The Interlocutionary Act***

the interlocutionary act or the allocutionary act

One important aspect of discourse is that it is addressed to someone. There is another speaker who is the addressee of the discourse. The presence of the pair, speaker and hearer, constitutes language as communication. (14)

Roman Jakobson, for example, starts from the threefold relation between speaker, hearer, and message, then adds three other complementary actors which enrich his model. These are code, contact, and context. On the basis of this six factor system he establishes a six function schema.

For the linguist, communication is a fact, even a most obvious fact. ... But for an existential investigation communication is an enigma, even a wonder. (15)

Yet, nevertheless, something passes from me to you. Something is transferred from one sphere of life to another. This something is not the experience as experienced, but its meaning. Here is the miracle. The experience as experienced, as lived, remains private, but its sense, its meaning becomes public. Communication in this way is the overcoming of the radical noncommunicability of the lived experienced as lived.

The event is not only the experience as expressed and communicated, but also the intersubjective exchange itself, the happening of dialogue.

discourse as event plus sense,

the self-transcendence of the event in its meaning

the grammatical devices which provide a singular experience with a public dimension. (16)

can we communicate the speech act as an illocutionary act? (17)

In many ways illocutionary acts can be communicated to the extent that their "grammar" provides the event with a public structure. (18)

To conclude this discussion of the dialectic of event and meaning, we may say that language is itself the process by which private experience is made public. Language is the exteriorization thanks to which an impression is transcended and becomes an ex-expression, or, in other words, the transformation of the psychic into the noetic. Exteriorization and communicability are one and the same thing for they are nothing other than this elevation of a part of our life into the *logos* of discourse. There the solution of life is for a moment, anyway, illuminated by the common light of discourse. (19)

## **5. Meaning as "Sense" and "Reference"**

what the speaker does

what the sentence does

This subjective-objective dialectic

The "objective" side of discourse itself may be taken in two different ways. We may mean the "what" of discourse or the "about what" of discourse. The "what" of discourse is its "sense," the

"about what" is its "reference."

Gottlob Frege, "*Ueber Sinn und Bedeutung*," (19)

distinction between semiotics and semantics

Only the sentence level allows us to distinguish what is said and about what it is said. In the system of language, say as a lexicon, there is no problem of reference; signs only refer to other signs within the system. With the sentence, however, language is directed beyond itself.

language has a reference only when it is used.

That someone refers to something at a certain time is an event, a speech event. But this event receives its structure from the meaning as sense.

But the dialectic of sense and reference is so original that it can be taken as an independent guideline. Only this dialectic says something about the relation between language and the ontological condition of being in the world. Language is not a world of its own. It is not even a world. But because we are in the world, .... we (20) have something to say, we have experience to bring to language.

This notion of bringing experience to language is the ontological condition of reference, an ontological condition reflected within language as a postulate which has not immanent justification;

If language were not fundamentally referential, would or could it be meaningful?

Finally, semiotics appears as a mere abstraction of semantics. And the semiotic definition of the sign as an inner difference between signifier and signified presupposes its semantic definition as reference to the thing for which it stands. The most concrete definition of semantics, then, is the (21) theory that relates the inner or immanent constitution of the sense to the outer or transcendent intention of the reference.

the utterer's meaning has to be expressed in the language of reference as the self-reference of discourse, i.e., as the designation of its speaker at the same time that it refers to the world. This correlation is not fortuitous, since it is ultimately the speaker who refers to the world in speaking. Discourse in action and in use refers backwards and forwards, to a speaker and a world. (22)

## **6. Some Hermeneutical Implication**

They mainly concern the use and abuse of the concept of speech events in the Romantic tradition of hermeneutics. Hermeneutics as issuing from Schleiermacher and Dilthey tended to identify interpretation with the category of "understanding," and to define understanding as the recognition of an author's intention from the point of view of the primitive addressees in the original situation of discourse.

Understanding a text, then, is only a particular case of the dialogical situation in which someone responds to someone else.

This psychologizing conception of hermeneutics has had a great influence on Christian theology.

this speech event is the Kerygma, the preaching of the Gospel. (22)

The assumptions of a psychologizing hermeneutics --- stem from a double misunderstanding of



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the dialectic of event and meaning in discourse and the dialectic of sense and reference in meaning itself.

what is at stake in this discussion is the correct definition of the hermeneutical task.

These dialectical polarities allow us anticipate that the concepts of intention and dialogue are not to be excluded from hermeneutics, but instead are to be released from the onesidedness of a non-dialectical concept of discourse. (23)

#### <参考文献・和書>

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