

第一部：自然の宗教哲学の構築を目指して第一章：自然の宗教哲学の構想とティリッヒの次元論**第二章：宗教言語と科学言語**2 - 1：問題状況

1. 前期講義：生の次元論から自然の宗教哲学へ

宗教と科学との次元の相違と相補性

2. ティリッヒの科学論

3. 区別から類似性、そして区別

Jürgen Moltmann, *Erfahrungen theologischen Denkens. Wege und Formen christlicher Theologie*, Chr. Kaiser 1999

他なるもの・異質なるものの認識プロセス

区別 より大きな類似性 より大きな区別

4. 生の次元論の具体化として

宗教と科学との関係論についての言語論

区別 類似 区別

5. 二つの観点から：隠喩とレトリック

2 - 2：隠喩論から見た科学と宗教**1. 現代言語論における隠喩**

Michael A. Arbib and Mary B. Hesse

The Construction of Reality, Cambridge University Press 1986

(1) 区別1：伝統的古典的な言語論

隠喩は、指示機能を有しない(現実について語らない)、真理には関わらない、装飾的
宗教言語は、主観的・情動的

rejection of the literalist view of language as an ideal static system with fixed meanings
Metaphors have as such no truth value and therefore no cognitive value in
expressing knowledge of the world.

to suggest on the contrary that metaphor after all has cognitive status is to question
the grounds of most of applied logic and semantics. Nevertheless, if we are to make any
sense of most everyday speech, let alone the language of ideology and religion, we must
give some cognitive status to metaphor. (148)

To understand the connection between scientific realism, the positivist theory of
knowledge, and the literalist view of language, we need to go back to the
seventeenth-century scientific revolution and beyond that to Aristotle. Much of Aristotelian
philosophy was discredited and explicitly rejected by the pioneers of modern science, but

his theory of language remained essentially unscathed. In the seventeenth century, the rise of science was accompanied by the conception of an "ideal language"..... The metaphor of "two books" is pervasive:

Bacon: *Natural and Experimental History*

Leibniz: *characteristica universalis*

cf. Umberto Eco, *La ricerca della lingua perfetta nella cultura europea* Roma-Bari, Laterza 1993

The notion of an ideal language perfectly reflecting the world has a philosophical pedigree going back at least to Aristotle.

Aristotelian world in which all objects and events fall into complexes of a finite (though perhaps very large) number of fixed species or natural kinds. This is exactly the world Aristotle adopted for his ontology...

nature as a treelike hierarchy of species and genera (149)

The theory of the ideal language and the ideal science fits this ontology like a glove. Any language contains in practice a finite number of general terms, and an ideal language contains enough for them to "mirror" the fixed number of natural kinds that are to be made isomorphic with them in the ideal science. ... This program for both language and science was the seventeenth-century dream, which still maintains its hold under the guise of the correspondence theory of truth, The seventeenth-century myth has conspired with the nineteenth-century dream of a universal logic... (150)

formal analysis of language in terms of precise and stable meanings. In this formal analysis, metaphoric uses of words are in some way improper or deviant. If metaphor is to be taken seriously, it implies changing meanings; in a literalist theory, however, there is no room for understanding metaphor as implying continual shifts of meaning, because literal meanings are either constant, that is univocal, or equivocal. (150)

(2) 類似(ブラック、ヘッセ/リクール/レイコフ、瀬戸)

隠喩の認知機能・現実の再記述、隠喩的真理

発見的機能、世界の見方を教える(これまでとは別様に)

We are going to argue for a nonliteralist theory of meaning and metaphor compatible with an account of language as rooted in schemas. Specially, we argue for the thesis that "all language is metaphorical." (150)

Lying behind this notion of "proper" and "improper" application of terms, and behind almost all subsequent discussion of metaphor, is an Aristotelian philosophy of universals. Universals are the correlates in reality of the "proper" use of universal terms; it is therefore at this level that the significance of metaphor must be analyzed. An alternative to the Aristotelian theory of universals can be found in Wittgenstein's (1953) account of "family resemblances"(FR)... Here, objects may form a class to whose members a predicate P is correctly ascribed, without assuming that there is any universal "P-ness" realized by each

other. Instead, we assume that in an FR class,..., the members of enough pairs of objects in the class resemble each other in some respects relevant to P so these resemblances can form, as it were, a chainlike structure through the class in such a way that there are relatively clear cases of objects falling within the class and relatively clear cases of those that do not. ... Wittgenstein argued from ordinary usage that there are such cases of irreducible FR. (151)

Contrary to Aristotle's belief, no two particular objects or events share exactly the same properties, whether theses are called "essential" or "accidental," and indeed this distinction is a false one. Locke ... General terms are necessary, but their use entails some loss of information about the world. (151)

Understood in terms of this FR analysis, metaphorical shifts of meaning depending on similarities and differences between objects are pervasive in language, not deviant, and some of the mechanisms of metaphor are essential to the meaning of any descriptive language whatever. This is what is meant here by the thesis that "all language is metaphorical." (152)

The thesis that all language is metaphorical rejects this classical analysis to highlight the fact that explicit use of metaphor and simile are themselves based on the most fundamental linguistic fact of all --- namely, that linguistic reference always depends on perceived similarities and differences. ... metonymy (parts/whole, effects/causes) ... We assume that "all language is metaphorical" in a fundamental sense that underlies all meaning tropes; but this is only the beginning of our problems. (153)

Our starting point is Max Black's interaction theory of metaphor as modified in the light of Wittgenstein's FR. We use the term meaning loosely as an inclusive term for reference, use, and the relevant set of what Black calls the "associated commonplace" ... called up by metaphoric usage. (154)

We saw that if "truth" is understood in the sense of ideal correspondence and if it has the meaning in propositional logic, then metaphorical utterance are effectively equivocal in meaning, have no truth value, and do not permit deductive inference. But we have abandoned strict correspondence and deduction, except as special limiting cases; it thus remains to find a new sense of "truth" more adequate to the new view of meaning and language. (154-155)

the use of metaphor in language has the functions not only of extending meaning and defining new meanings but also of the interaction and redescription of domains already seen through one metaphor frame in terms of another. Such redescription can have disruptive effects on previously complacent ways of looking at the world.

Lakoff and Johnson: "Argument is war"

extended metaphor: Your claims are indefensible. He attacked every weak point in my argument. His criticisms were right on target.

To philosophers, this may seem the only natural and "correct" way of talking about argument, but it depends on metaphor just as the first example did and is

equally revealing of a certain set of value judgements about what argument is.
Contrast another metaphor, equally familiar in modern context: "Argument is negotiation," with its accompanying

Metaphor is potentially revolutionary. (155-156)

In such cases, the question "Which metaphor is true ?" cannot expect a single or simple answer. There is no "fact" to which "argument" corresponds that has the natural character of "war" or "logic" or "negotiation." The extended metaphors are not in that sense true or false but are appropriate or inappropriate, more or less revealing, more or less useful, depending on the context of application and their coherence with evaluative judgements made about particular situation. (156)

Metaphor causes us to "see" the phenomena differently and causes the meaning of terms that are relatively observational and literal in the original system to shift toward the metaphoric meaning. ... In terms of the metaphor, we can find and express deeper analogies between diverse phenomena; or, of course, in the case of bad metaphors we may find we are misled by them. (156)

This interaction view of theoretical models is compatible with the thesis that observations are theory laden. It entails the abandonment of the a two-tiered account of language in which some observational uses are irreducibly literal and invariant with respect to all changes of the language and content of explanatory theory. The interaction view sees all language, including the scientific, as dynamic. (156-157)

(3) 区別2

・宗教的実在とは如何なるリアリティか

常に新しくあるために、古い地平を絶えず越えてゆく推進力としての宗教的実在
究極的目的の具体的提示・神の国

・現実の見方と 관련된 自己のあり方の転換、つまり救済的機能

In the metaphorical view, logical consistency is no longer at the heart of language. Rather, as we in our discussion of Piaget, the reconciliation of logical discrepancies assumes a driving role for change of meaning; similarly in science, we reconfigure both theory and observation language to allow us to describe and explain a wider range of phenomena. This does not mean, however, that the metaphoric view entails abandonment of logic and deduction in science. Indeed, we may see this as chief distinction between use of metaphor in science and in poetry. Good poetic metaphors are initially striking, unexpected, and perhaps shocking. They extend and ramify by association and analogy not by logic..... Scientific metaphor, on the other side, may be initially unexpected; once established as useful, however, they are extended and developed by logic as well as by analogy. They are meant to be internally tightly knit by logical and causal interrelations. (157)

We found reason to reject both assumptions. Implied classifications and analogies can

only be stated in a language containing some other implied classifications and analogies. Reality is never exactly captured in explicit speech. This is not, however, a nonempirical idealism because it does not deny that there is a real structure in the world, of which science progressively exhibits more as it learns more about the natural environment by the feedback method of the pragmatic criterion. Nor does it ascribe a strong realism to scientific theory because science does not capture this structure in a detailed isomorphism of true categories and true statements with the world.

Scientific theory provides constructed models of scientific reality that are distinguished from other types of social and poetic construction by being constrained by feedback loops involving experimentation in the natural world. (159)

Scientific models are a prototype, philosophically speaking, for imaginative creations or schemas based on natural language and experience, but they go beyond it by metaphorical extension to construct symbolic worlds that may or may not adequately represent certain aspects of the empirical world. These symbolic worlds all share with scientific models the function of describing and redescribing the world; and for all of them it is inappropriate to ask for literal truth as direct correspondence with the world. Symbolic worlds differ from scientific models, however, in that it is not their function to represent the state of the natural environment for purposes of prediction and control. As their functions differ, so their means of validation will also be expected to be different. (161)

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伝統的な言語理解と真理論

言語と世界: 写像

言語は世界を写す

真理の対応説

Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus*,

translated by D.F.Pears & McGuinness, with the Introduction by Bertrand Russell
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961(1921)

The whole sense of the book might be summed up in the following words: what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence. (3)

- 1 The world is all that is the case.
 - 1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things.
 - 1.2 The world divides into facts.
- 2 What is the case --- a fact --- is the existence of states of affairs.
 - 2.01 A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things)
 - 2.02 Objects are simple.
 - 2.0201 Every statement about complexes can be resolved into a statement about their constituents and into the propositions that describe the complexes completely.

- 2.031 In a state of affairs objects stand in a determinate relation to one another.
- 2.04 The totality of existing states of affairs is the world.
- 2.05 The totality of existing states of affairs also determines which states of affairs do not exist.
- 2.06 The existence and non-existence of states of affairs is reality. (We also call the existence of states of affairs a positive fact, and their non-existence a negative fact.)
- 2.063** The sum-total of reality is the world.
- 2.1** We picture facts to ourselves.
- 2.11 A picture presents a situation in logical space, the existence and non-existence of states of affairs.
- 2.12** A picture is a model of reality.
- 2.13** In a picture objects have the elements of the picture corresponding to them.
- 2.131** In a picture the elements of the picture are the representatives of objects.
- 2.151 Pictorial form is the possibility that things are related to one another in the same way as the elements of the picture.
- 2.1511 That is how a picture is attached to reality; it reaches right out to it.
- 2.1512 It is laid against reality like a measure.
- 2.19 Logical pictures can depict the world.
- 2.2** A picture has logico-pictorial form in common with what is depicted.
- 2.202 A picture represents a possibility of the situation in logical space.
- 2.21** A picture agrees with reality or fails to agree; it is correct or incorrect, true or false.
- 2.221** What a picture represents is its sense.
- 2.222** The agreement or disagreement of its sense with reality constitutes its truth or falsity.
- 2.225 There are no pictures that are true a priori.
- 3 A logical pictures of facts is a thought.
- 3.001 'A state of affairs is thinkable': what this means is that we can picture it to ourselves.
- 3.01 The totality of true thoughts is a picture of the world.
- 3.03 Thought can never be of anything illogical, since, if it were, we should have to think illogically.
- 3.1 In a proposition a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by the senses.
- 3.202 The simple signs employed in propositions are called names.
- 3.203 A name means an object. The object is its meaning. ('A' is the same sign as 'A'.)
- 3.22 In a proposition a name is the representative of an object.
- 3.221 Objects can only be named. Signs are their representatives. I can only

speaking about them: I cannot put them into words. Propositions can only say how things are, not what they are.

- 3.4 A proposition determines a place in logical space.
- 4 A thought is a proposition with a sense.
- 4.001 The totality of propositions is language.
- 4.002 Everyday language is a part of the human organism and is no less complicated than it. It is not humanly possible to gather immediately from it what the logic of language is.
- 4.003 Most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical.
- 4.0031 All philosophy is a 'critique of language'.
- 4.01 A proposition is a picture of reality
A proposition is a model of reality as we imagine it.
- 4.002 A proposition shows its sense.
A proposition shows how things stand if it is true. And it says that they do so stand.
- 4.05 Reality is compared with propositions.
- 4.2 The sense of a proposition is its agreement and disagreement with possibilities of existence and non-existence of states of affairs.
- 4.21 The simplest kind of proposition, an elementary proposition, asserts the existence of a state of affairs.
- 5.6 The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.
- 5.61 Logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also its limits.... We cannot think what cannot think; so what we cannot think we cannot say either.
- 5.62 The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language ... means the limits of my world.
- 5.621 The world and life are one.
- 5.63 I am my world. (The microcosm)
- 5.631 There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas.
- 5.632 The subject does not belong to the world: rather it is a limit of the world.
- 6.41 The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen: in it no value exists --- and if it did exist, it would have no value.
- 6.42 So too it is impossible that there be propositions of ethics.
- 6.432 How things are in the world is a matter of complete indifference for what is higher. God does not reveal himself in the world.
- 6.44 It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists.
- 6.53 The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science...

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Albert Einstein, Science and Religion (I-1939; II-1940), in: Albert Einstein, *Out of my later years*, The Citadel press 1956 pp.21-30

「宗教と科学の諸領域はそれら自身において相互に明確に区別されるとしても、それにもかかわらず、両者の間には、強い交互関係と依存性が存在している。目的を規定するのは宗教かもしれないが、宗教は、どの手段が自らの設定した目的に到達するのに寄与するかについて、もっとも広い意味において、科学から学ぶことができる。これに対して、科学は真理と理解への熱望を徹底的に吹き込まれている人々によってのみ創造されうるのである。しかしながら、感情のこの源泉は宗教の領域から由来する。これには、現実存在の世界に妥当する諸規則が合理的である、すなわち諸規則は理性にとって理解可能である、との信念も属している。わたしは、この深い信念を持たないような本物の科学者など考えることができない。この状況は次のような比喩を用いて表現できるであろう。宗教のない科学はまっすぐ歩くことができず、科学のない宗教は行き当たりばったりである。」(ibid.,p.26)

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