

< 前々回 > キリスト教思想との関わりにおける形而上学の問題状況

0. 現代思想における反形而上学的動向

英米の宗教哲学とドイツ宗教哲学との相違

1. カントにおける二つの指摘 批判哲学

(1) 人間理性における形而上学の要求(形而上学的傾向性)

(2) 困難(独断論・仮象)

2. ハイデッガー

カントの(1)の方向性の存在論として展開することを試み、後に議論を転回する。

西洋的思惟を規定する存在神論(存在するものを基準とする)

存在忘却・ニヒリズムから、新しい思惟の始まりへ

弱き神

3. レヴィナス: 存在論ではなく

4. キリスト教思想: パネンベルクの場合

カント・ハイデッガー以降の問題状況の確認

神学(神論)にとっての形而上学的思惟の必要性

「歴史としての啓示」以来の構想

聖書的キリスト教的思惟自体の内部から

哲学的反省は宗教的な神理解を解明するための基準を定式化するが(無限、絶対、精神)、神理解の代わりをすることはできない。様々な宗教的伝統における神理解を比較して解明する。

宗教的神との関わりにおいて形而上学には一定の限界内での役割がある。

特定の宗教的伝統における神理解の説明ではなく、神理解を解明するための基準の定式化と有限なものの世界を包括的に解釈するという理性の上昇運動を遂行する。

5. 「宗教と科学」という問題設定との関わりで。

宗教的神と形而上学的理念との関係が問題となる。

宗教 - 形而上学 - 科学

第三章: 形而上学再考

3 - 3: 「宗教と科学」問題群と形而上学

- ギルキー -

Langdon Gilkey, *Nature, Reality, and the Sacred. The Nexus of Science and Religion*,
Fortress 1993

5 Science, Philosophy, and Theology (pp.59-76)

古い実証主義と新しい科学理解

In the preceding investigation of a selected number of modern cosmologies, they were found to represent the same objective scientific empiricism, positivism, or "naive

realism"... As in the late nineteenth century, such a positivistic view of physical science today presents a world within which any mode of religion makes little or no sense.

religious experience : a human projection grounded in ignorance, fear, and
fundamental alienation

a misunderstanding of religion, a challenge to the status and value of the humanities
a false estimate of the existential and historical human situation

The most relevant and fruitful arguments

this positivistic view of scientific knowledge and of its cosmological results
represents a misunderstanding of scientific knowledge itself.

such a movement of thought

a different philosophy of science,

a more encompassing epistemology, ontology, or metaphysics

the kind of philosophical theology (59)

科学についての新しい理解

all knowing involves a preunderstanding, all inquiry is theory-laden, hermeneutics

aspects of the manifold of experience become facts or data only when they are
discrimination as important, as "clues," from the whole welter of experience

only in such an ordered world is it possible to conceive and then to test a
hypothesis.

Without experience, such forms of order are empty, but without them experience is
blind.

a reality in part shaped by and even constructed in terms of the intellectual tradition of
the scientific community, the preunderstanding of the scientist herself.

Thomas Kuhn, Stephen Toulmin, R.G.Collingwood

the world described by science is in part always a historical construct, differing as the
cultural "minds" of different epochs and places differ. (60)

Reality and "scientific reality" are not identical: science is not a mirror of nature.

The findings of science historical documents, molded in part by the paradigms of
their time and place.

The thoughts humans think and the inquiries they make are historical,

Galileo, Berkley, Hume, Kant

that world of ordered sequences governed by necessary law is only the phenomenal
world, a construct by human sense and by the human mind out of the given. As a
consequence, the world so constructed, the world even of science, is not the "real" world,
the "thing in itself" or noumenon. ... Critical philosophy did not completely sunder scientific
knowledge and "reality," but it surely distinguished them --- and led many to think that the
naive realism of pre-Kantian philosophy was at an end. (61)

This deep gulf of ignorance between critical philosophy and the spokespersons for

modern science begs for an explanation.

批判哲学の再定式化の試み

The tradition of critical philosophy has continued in much important philosophy into our own day. Hence it has, like science, been significantly transformed.

George Santayana, Alfred North Whitehead

they reformulated in more intelligible terms the Kantian distinction between the world of appearance and so of scientific theory, on the one hand, and the ontologically real world, the Ding an sich, on the other hand.

the realm of matter (Santayana), concrete actuality (Whitehead)

Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, and Paul Tillich each represented a parallel mode of distinguishing the world of science from what Husserl called the primordial life world.

Richard Rorty, Richard Bernstein

Whitehead is impressed with what he likes to call the "abstract" character of the cosmos as described by modern science.

... does not fit with and so cannot be thought to undergird important and pervasive areas of common experience: social relations, courts of law, literature and art, commerce, morality, and so on. a world that is "quite unbelievable."

none of the presuppositions of science --- --- what are in philosophy the "categories" of existence, is experienced or known ... either by means of the experiments of science or in the sensory experience. "The categories are manifested elsewhere."

the two sensationalist dogma that only through sense data is reality known and that science alone therefore, gives indication of what is real, are false. There are other, more fundamental modes of experiencing, which are more directly in touch with actuality. These nonsensory perceptions are multiple.

the sense of "withness with the body" through which we are self-aware, or "know" ourselves as an organic unity; the sense of continuous and pervasive passage; and the sense of aims and of intentions for the immediate future.

Here actuality is itself experienced through our own participation in being the organic society we are, and this level of experience is rich in metaphysical implications. it is therefore through nonsensory experience that the reality, the "processing," the interconnectedness, and the order of experience in time are known; and it is this level of experience that, while beyond science (nonsensory), provides the bases or presuppositions of science. This Whitehead labels "experience in the mode of causal efficacy," and it is by metaphysical, not scientific, inquiry that these modes can be explored and concrete actuality more directly known. (63)

形而上学の役割・内容

metaphysics provides the theoretical framework (the "rationality") for science, which science by itself lacks.... it articulates into a coherent system the presuppositions for the special sciences. It provides a clearer, less abstract, more concrete, and more direct delineation of what is real and so the basis of our knowledge of the real. (63)

metaphysics can assess the cognitive value of each special mode of experiencing and knowing: the physical sciences, art, psychology, religion.

those factors crucial to all of experience

the universality of change, the pervasiveness of order, the continuity within time, the appearance of novelty, the importance of aims and values, the reality of purposes and responsibility, the grounds for hope.

These pervasive traits of experience can never be seen by the empirical method, for they are assumed and so are not noticed:

Civilization is utterly dependent on this faith in persuasive order and in value amid transience.

For Whitehead, then, while metaphysics will temper and limit the claims of the sciences described in these cosmologies, it will also provide the rational grounding that science needs; for metaphysics alone can ponder and articulate the structure of the whole, that unity of objects and subjects, of structure and meaning, of inquiring and the value of inquiry on which the science depend.

Tillich: only ontological inquiry can uncover and recover the full structure of finite being from which science has abstracted and thus give a more accurate and inclusive account of what is real.

Self and world represent a mutually dependent polarity. (64)

world as experienced and known by rational selves is

throughout dependent on the self as "reason" and as "spirit." (65)

to each ontology science, while within its own limits, valid and exceedingly reliable, represents an abstraction we must pass through and beyond, without denying, the objectified world of the physical sciences into the richer, "thicker," more mysterious actuality that lives within our widest experience.

Tillich: ontological reason

Whitehead: speculative reason (66)

In proposing that the sensed and human world is a "construct" and not the "thing in itself," a construct in correlation with a given that is "prehended" or felt, both are in the Kantian tradition; in affirming that a metaphysical analysis is nevertheless possible beyond the range of scientific empirical inquiry, both are non-Kantian.

World and mind are inextricably correlated or mutually dependent. World does not originate from mind, as idealism had stated; by the same token, however, the world as it is known by science is not independent of mind --- a se, so to speak--- but is itself in part a product of mind. That scientific world cannot be the mindless origin of mind.

For modern cosmologies, however, mind has largely been removed from the cosmos, the weighty of contribution of that observer in the construction of the world as it is known by their research is overlooked --- and no grounds are given for that omission. (67)

The argument has been that mind is correlated to the universe prior to scientific inquiry. The mistake is to take that world not as a construction of sense and mind but as itself the only real world.

These discussion seek to establish the link between mind and universe scientifically, (68)

修正された柔らかい批判哲学

If sensory experience and the science based on it are not isomorphic with the actualities so experienced and known, then at the least they can be said to be analogical. (69)

this abstracted account is analogical to the reality it portrays, (70)
Sense experience and science are analogical.

Here the critical philosophies that have been cited in this chapter depart from Kant to explore, by way of an "analogical metaphysics," the actuality from which science has abstracted signs.

The common methodological thread that guides Whitehead, Tillich, and Santayana out of the subjectivity of the Kantian maze is the notion of "participation." We know the reality through the senses and through science.... this external relation through the sense to the process that constitutes reality is not our only relation to that process. The process manifests itself in us, as well as in those objects "outside" of us. Further, this manifestations in us kindles our self-awareness: we are aware of our participation in existing, in being "real," in "being there," and in being immersed in change; and we are aware of our awareness, our consciousness. In us, "being" comes to self-awareness and self-consciousness (Tillich); (71)

We do know what it means to be ourselves and to be human. We are aware of our own being from the inside. Hence human being is the gateway to being.

These inner experiences of being, causal efficacy(Whitehead)

The result is the possibility of a metaphysical discrimination of the structure of actuality as actuality appears in us,

a modest metaphysical analysis

Whitehead names this ground of assurance (the order that we uncover is an order also characteristic of actuality) "faith," a faith in the rationality of things. (72)

批判的实在論から見た科学と宗教

science is inconsistent and its self-understanding incredible, if it seeks to understand itself merely in terms of itself and, as a consequence, paints itself as a purely empiricist

enterprise (73)

a world constructed by the sense organs

It is a realm of human symbols analogous to and so relevant to reality as human signs of reality; it is not a mirror of that reality as it is. (74)

concepts that unite self, culture, and world into an intelligible whole.

religion as a response to reality as well as a human construction

science, philosophy (ontology or metaphysics), and (philosophical) theology

Each differs from the others in the kinds of data or evidence in experience

which it appeals and in the areas of experience in which it works.

in the kind of intelligibility, the kinds of "explanation"

in the sorts of authority

science seeks the invariant structures of specific ontic processes, and it appeals to sensory, quantitative data,

Philosophy seeks the universal structures of all that is, and it appeals to the entire width of experience; (75)

Theology seeks the meaning of the structures provided by the sciences and envisioned by philosophy. Its fundamental symbols are drawn from its own religious tradition, in dialogue with other tradition as well as with all else in cultural life;

they are mutually interdependent and mutually corrective,

discussion of the mutual distinction and yet mutual dependence of philosophy and theology. (76)