

第三章：形而上学再考

Langdon Gilkey, *Nature, Reality, and the Sacred. The Nexus of Science and Religion*,
Fortress 1993

5 Science, Philosophy, and Theology (pp.59-76)

古い実証主義から新しい科学理解

In the preceding investigation of a selected number of modern cosmologies, they were found to represent the same objective scientific empiricism, positivism, or "naive realism".... As in the late nineteenth century, such a positivistic view of physical science today presents a world within which any mode of religion makes little or no sense.

religious experience : a human projection grounded in ignorance, fear, and
fundamental alienation

a misunderstanding of religion, a challenge to the status and value of the humanities

The most relevant and fruitful arguments

this positivistic view of scientific knowledge and of its cosmological results

represents a misunderstanding of scientific knowledge itself. (59)

科学についての新しい理解

all knowing involves a preunderstanding, all inquiry is theory-laden, hermeneutics

aspects of the manifold of experience become facts or data only when they are

discrimination as important, as "clues," from the whole welter of experience

only in such an ordered world is it possible to conceive and then to test a hypothesis.

Without experience, such forms of order are empty, but without them experience is blind.

a reality in part shaped by and even constructed in terms of the intellectual tradition of the scientific community, the preunderstanding of the scientist herself.

Thomas Kuhn, Stephen Toulmin, R.G.Collingwood

Kant

that world of ordered sequences governed by necessary law is only the phenomenal world, a construct by human sense and by the human mind out of the given. As a consequence, the world so constructed, the world even of science, is not the "real" world, the "thing in itself" or noumenon. ... Critical philosophy did not completely sunder scientific knowledge and "reality," but it surely distinguished them --- and led many to think that the naive realism of pre-Kantian philosophy was at an end. (61)

This deep gulf of ignorance between critical philosophy and the spokespersons for modern science begs for an explanation.

批判哲学の再定式化の試み (ポスト・カント的な形而上学)

George Santayana, Alfred North Whitehead, Paul Tillich

none of the presuppositions of science --- --- what are in philosophy the "categories" of existence, is experienced or known ... either by means of the experiments of science or in the sensory experience. "The categories are manifested elsewhere."

the two sensationalist dogma

There are other, more fundamental modes of experiencing, which are more directly in touch with actuality. These nonsensory perceptions are multiple.

Here actuality is itself experienced through our own participation in being the organic society we are, and this level of experience is rich in metaphysical implications. (63)

形而上学の役割・内容

metaphysics provides the theoretical framework (the "rationality") for science, which science by itself lacks.... it articulates into a coherent system the presuppositions for the special sciences. It provides a clearer, less abstract, more concrete, and more direct delineation of what is real and so the basis of our knowledge of the real. (63)

metaphysics can assess the cognitive value of each special mode of experiencing and knowing: the physical sciences, art, psychology, religion.

those factors crucial to all of experience

the universality of change, the pervasiveness of order, the continuity within time, the appearance of novelty, the importance of aims and values, the reality of purposes and responsibility, the grounds for hope.

These pervasive traits of experience can never be seen by the empirical method, for they are assumed and so are not noticed:

Civilization is utterly dependent on this faith in persuasive order and in value amid transience.

For Whitehead, then, while metaphysics will temper and limit the claims of the sciences described in these cosmologies, it will also provide the rational grounding that science needs; for metaphysics alone can ponder and articulate the structure of the whole, that unity of objects and subjects, of structure and meaning, of inquiring and the value of inquiry on which the science depend.

Tillich: Self and world represent a mutually dependent polarity. (64)

In proposing that the sensed and human world is a "construct" and not the "thing in itself," a construct in correlation with a given that is "prehended" or felt, both are in the Kantian tradition; in affirming that a metaphysical analysis is nevertheless possible beyond the range of scientific empirical inquiry, both are non-Kantian.

World and mind are inextricably correlated or mutually dependent. World does not originate from mind, as idealism had stated; by the same token, however, the world as it is known by science is not independent of mind --- a se, so to speak--- but is itself in part a product of mind. That scientific world cannot be the mindless origin of mind.

For modern cosmologies, however, mind has largely been removed from the cosmos, the weighty of contribution of that observer in the construction of the world as it is known by their research is overlooked --- and no grounds are given for that omission. (67)

The argument has been that mind is correlated to the universe prior to scientific inquiry. The mistake is to take that world not as a construction of sense and mind but as itself the only real world.

These discussion seek to establish the link between mind and universe scientifically, (68)

修正された柔らかい批判哲学

If sensory experience and the science based on it are not isomorphic with the actualities so experienced and known, then at the least they can be said to be analogical. (69)

this abstracted account is analogical to the reality it portrays, (70)
Sense experience and science are analogical.

Here the critical philosophies that have been cited in this chapter depart from Kant to explore, by way of an "analogical metaphysics," the actuality from which science has abstracted signs.

The common methodological thread that guides Whitehead, Tillich, and Santayana out of the subjectivity of the Kantian maze is the notion of "participation." We know the reality through the senses and through science.... this external relation through the sense to the process that constitutes reality is not our only relation to that process. The process manifests itself in us, as well as in those objects "outside" of us. Further, this manifestations in us kindles our self-awareness: we are aware of our participation in existing, in being "real," in "being there," and in being immersed in change; and we are aware of our awareness, our consciousness. In us, "being" comes to self-awareness and self-consciousness (Tillich); (71)

We do know what it means to be ourselves and to be human. We are aware of our own being from the inside. Hence human being is the gateway to being.

These inner experiences of being, causal efficacy(Whitehead)

The result is the possibility of a metaphysical discrimination of the structure of actuality as actuality appears in us,

a modest metaphysical analysis

Whitehead names this ground of assurance (the order that we uncover is an order also characteristic of actuality) "faith," a faith in the rationality of things. (72)

批判的实在論から見た科学と宗教

science is inconsistent and its self-understanding incredible, if it seeks to understand itself merely in terms of itself and, as a consequence, paints itself as a purely empiricist

enterprise (73)
 a world constructed by the sense organs
 It is a realm of human symbols analogous to and so relevant to reality as human signs
 of reality; it is not a mirror of that reality as it is. (74)
 concepts that unite self, culture, and world into an intelligible whole.

religion as a response to reality as well as a human construction
 science, philosophy (ontology or metaphysics), and (philosophical) theology
 Each differs from the others in the kinds of data or evidence in experience
 which it appeals and in the areas of experience in which it works.
 in the kind of intelligibility, the kinds of "explanation"
 in the sorts of authority
 science seeks the invariant structures of specific ontic processes, and it appeals
 to sensory, quantitative data,
 Philosophy seeks the universal structures of all that is, and it appeals to the
 entire width of experience; (75)
 Theology seeks the meaning of the structures provided by the sciences and
 envisioned by philosophy. Its fundamental symbols are drawn from its own
 religious tradition, in dialogue with other tradition as well as with all else in
 cultural life;
 they are mutually interdependent and mutually corrective,
 discussion of the mutual distinction and yet mutual dependence of philosophy and
 theology. (76)

3 - 4 : 形而上学の可能性

1. ホワイトヘッド哲学へのアプローチ	5/26
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EXKURS2: 6/2, EXKURS 3: 6/23

1. ホワイトヘッド哲学へのアプローチ

- * Alfred North Whitehead, 1861-1947 : 数学基礎論から科学哲学、そして形而上学へ
 『数学原理』、『自然認識の諸原理』、『自然という概念』、『相対性原理』
Science and the Modern World, 1925
Religion in the Making, 1926
Process and Reality. An Essay in cosmology, 1929 (1969)
Adventures of Ideas, 1933 A Free Press Paperback

< Process and Reality >

Part I: The Speculative Scheme

I: Speculative Philosophy

II: The Categorical Scheme

III: Some Derivative Notions

Part II: Discussions and Applications

Part III: The Theory of Prehension

Part IV: The Theory of Extension

Part V: Final Interpretation : I: The Ideal Opposites II: God and the World

Speculative Philosophy is the endeavour to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted.

(5)

The true method of discovery is like the flight of an aeroplane. It starts from the ground of particular observation; it makes a flight in the thin air of imaginative generalization; and it again lands for renewed observation rendered acute by rational interpretation. The reason for the success of this method of imaginative rationalization is that, when the method of difference fails, factors which are constantly present may yet be observed under the influence of imaginative thought.

(7)

the method of generalization

In this description of philosophic method, the term 'philosophic generalization' has meant 'the utilization of specific notions, applying to a restricted group of facts, for the divination of the generic notions which apply to all facts.'

(8)

logical perfection, coherence,

incoherence (the arbitrary disconnection of first principles)

Descartes' two kinds of substance, corporeal and mental

the philosophy of organism

the chief error in philosophy is overstatement. The aim at generalization is sound, but the estimate of success is exaggerated. There are two main forms of such overstatement. One form is what I have termed elsewhere, the 'fallacy of misplaced concreteness.'

neglecting the degree of abstraction involved when an actual entity is considered merely so far as it exemplifies certain categories of thought. (10)

The other form of overstatement consists in a false estimate of logical procedure in respect certainty. (10-11)

the unfortunate notion that its method is dogmatically to indicate premises which are severally clear, distinct, and certain; and to erect upon those premises a deductive system of thought.

Philosophy has been misled by the example of mathematics;

The verification of a rationalistic scheme is to be sought in its general success, and not

in the peculiar certainty, or initial clarity, of its first principles. (11)

Metaphysical categories are not dogmatic statements of the obvious; they are tentative formulations of the ultimate generalities.

The scheme is true with unformulated qualifications, exceptions, limitations, and new interpretations in terms of more general notions. We do not yet know how to recast the scheme into a logical truth. But the scheme is a matrix from which true propositions applicable to particular circumstances can be derived. We can at present only trust our trained instincts as to the discrimination of the circumstances in respect to which the scheme is valid. (11)

progress is always a transcendence of what is obvious.

Rationalism is an adventure in the clarification of thought, progressive and never final. But it is an adventure in which even partial success has importance. (12)

The study of philosophy is a voyage towards the larger generalities.

Thus one aim of philosophy is to challenge the half-truths constituting the scientific first principles. The systematization of knowledge cannot be conducted in watertight compartments. All general truths condition each other.

The primary method of mathematics is deduction; the primary method of philosophy is descriptive generalization. (13)

One practical aim of metaphysics is the accurate analysis of proposition; not merely of metaphysical propositions, but of quite ordinary propositions.... The one genus of facts which constitutes the field of some special science requires some common metaphysical presupposition respecting the universe. (15)

The technical language of philosophy represents attempts of various schools of thought to obtain explicit expression of general ideas presupposed by the facts of experience. (15)

The truth itself is nothing else than how the composite natures of the organic actualities of the world obtain adequate representation in the divine nature.

the consequent nature of God, ontological principle (16)

The only possible procedure is to start from verbal expressions.... But no language can be anything but elliptical, requiring a leap of the imagination to understand its meaning in the relevance to immediate experience. (16)

Philosophy is the self-correction by consciousness of its own initial excess of subjectivity. (18)

The task of philosophy is to recover the totality obscured by the selection.

Philosophy frees itself from the taint of ineffectiveness by its close relations with religion and with science, natural and sociological. It attains its chief importance by fusing the two, namely religion and science, into one rational scheme of thought.

This demand for an intellectual justification of brute experience has also been the motive power in the advance of European science. In this sense scientific interest is only a variant form of religious interest. (19)

the assertion that empirically the development of self-justifying thoughts has been achieved by the complex process of generalizing from particular topics, of imaginatively schematizing the generalizations, and finally by renewed comparison of the imagined scheme with direct experience to which it should apply. (20)

Speculative boldness / complete humility before logic, and before fact.

The useful function of philosophy is to promote the most general systematization of civilized thought. (21)