

<インタビュー>

- 1 . エコロジの神学の諸問題
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4 . 形而上学の意義

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- 4 - 3 : 新しいキリスト教思想の動向から

4 - 1 : 形而上学とは何か

(1) 形而上学の定義

Martin Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, Vittorio Klostermann 1973(1929)

(2) 形而上学批判とその論点

1 . 論理実証主義・分析哲学

A.J.Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic*, Penguin Books 1936(1982)

2 . カント

Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*

Vorrede zur ersten Auflage 1781 (Kants Werke. Akademie Textausgabe IV)

3 . カントからハイデッガー : 形而上学の基礎付けから形而上学の克服へ

『存在と時間』『カントと形而上学の問題』

中期ハイデッガー : 存在 - 神 - 論の神から弱い神へ (転回)

- ・ 存在忘却(Seinsvergessenheit)としての西洋の歴史
- ・ 存在 - 神論 (Onto-theo-logie) : 抽象的一般性と最高存在 (強い神)
- ・ ハイデッガー問題 : キリスト教にとって形而上学とは何か。

4 . レヴィナス : 存在論から倫理へ

(3) 人間存在にとっての形而上学 (人間の可能性としての形而上学)

カントの無制約者の命題

Die Vernunft fordert dieses nach Grundsatz: wenn das Bedingte gegeben ist, so ist auch die ganze Summe der Bedingungen, mithin das schlechthin Unbedingte gegeben, wodurch jenes allein möglich war. (283)

Die cosmologischen Idee also beschäftigen sich mit der Totalität der regressiven Synthesis und gehen in antecedentia , nicht in consequentia. (284)

Die menschliche Vernunft ist ihrer Natur nach architektonisch, d.i. sie betrachtet alle Erkenntnisse als gehörig zu einem möglichen System und verstattet daher auch nur solche Principien, die eine vorhabende Erkenntnis wenigstens nicht unfähig machen, in irgend einem System mit anderen zusammen zu stehen. (329)

5 . パネンベルク : 形而上学批判を経て形而上学へ

Wolfhart Pannenberg, *Metaphysik und Gottesgedanke*, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1988

(1) Das Ende der Metaphysik und der Gottesgedanke

Die in den beiden letzten Jahrhunderten herrschend gewordene Meinung hat das Zeitalter der Metaphysik als beendet betrachtet. (7)

Wenn das nicht der Fall ist, dann bringt die theologische Selbstausslegung des Glaubens nur ein subjektives Engagement des Theologen zum Ausdruck.

Eine neue Zuwendung zur Metaphysik kann schwerlich erfolgen, ohne auf die Argumente einzugehen, auf die sich die These vom Ende der Metaphysik stützte. (9)

Die Philosophie entspricht, wie Dieter Henrich sagt, der im menschlichen Leben verwurzelten Nötigung zu Lebensdeutungen, (15)

Erst der >>Überstieg<< (D.Henrich) über die endlichen Gegenstände und über das Ich, dem sie gegeben sind, bringt die >>Welt<< als ihren Inbegriff in den Blick, das Ganze also, innerhalb dessen jeder einzelne der Gegenstände seinen Ort hat. (16)

der metaphysische Überstieg zum Gedanken des Einen (18)

(2) Das Problem des Absoluten

Es gibt keine Metaphysik ohne die Idee der Einheit der Wirklichkeit, und da die Einheit des Wirklichen als Welt, Kosmos, die Einheit einer Ordnung des Vielen, des vielfältig Einzelnen ist, so ist mit der Einheit der Welt die Frage nach dem Grunde verbunden, der das Viele zur Einheit zusammenordnet und zusammenhält. (20)

Ausdruck des Bedürfnisses unserer Vernunft nach unbedingter Einheit des Mannigfaltigen der Erfahrung, (20)

unvollendbar als Idee und bloße Ideal der Vernunft. (20)

Einheit und Differenz von Subjektivität und außersubjektiver Wirklichkeit sind in ihm immer schon verbunden. (20)

Dennoch ist die Idee der Totalität erfahrbarer Wirklichkeit mehr als ein beliebiger subjektiver Gedanke, da dieser Idee in der einen oder anderen Form Bedingung der Erfassung und Bestimmung der einzelnen Gegenstände der Erfahrung ist.

als Teile der Totalität solcher Gegenstände sind sie jeweils >>etwas<< im Unterschied zu andern solchen Gegenständen. (21)

Mit dem Gedanken der Grenze aber ist immer zugleich schon ein jenseits der Grenze Gelegenes gedacht, wenn auch nur vage. (21)

< 問題状況 >

1 . 現代思想における反形而上学的動向

2 . カントにおける二つの指摘 批判哲学

(1)人間理性における形而上学の要求(形而上学的傾向性)

(2)困難(独断論・仮象)

3 . ハイデッガー

カントの(1)の方向性の存在論として展開することを試み、後に議論を転回する。

西洋的思惟を規定する存在神論（存在するものを基準とする）
存在忘却・ニヒリズムから、新しい思惟の始まりへ
弱き神

4 . レヴィナス：存在論ではなく、倫理へ。別の形而上学の可能性（超越、他者）

5 . キリスト教思想：パネンベルクの場合

カント・ハイデッガー以降の問題状況の確認

カント・ドイツ観念論の議論の再開

神学（神論）にとっての形而上学的思惟の必要性 有意味性についての問い
全体 - 部分

4 - 2 : 形而上学の再考に向けて

Langdon Gilkey, *Nature, Reality, and the Sacred. The Nexus of Science and Religion*,

Fortress 1993

古い実証主義の科学理解

In the preceding investigation of a selected number of modern cosmologies, they were found to represent the same objective scientific empiricism, positivism, or "naive realism".... As in the late nineteenth century, such a positivistic view of physical science today presents a world within which any mode of religion makes little or no sense.

religious experience : a human projection grounded in ignorance, fear, and
fundamental alienation

a misunderstanding of religion, a challenge to the status and value of the humanities

this positivistic view of scientific knowledge and of its cosmological results represents a
misunderstanding of scientific knowledge itself. (59)

科学についての新しい理解

such a movement of thought

a different philosophy of science, (59)

all knowing involves a preunderstanding, all inquiry is theory-laden, hermeneutics

aspects of the manifold of experience become facts or data only when they are
discrimination as important, as "clues," from the whole welter of experience

only in such an ordered world is it possible to conceive and then to test a hypothesis.

Without experience, such forms of order are empty, but without them experience is blind.

a reality in part shaped by and even constructed in terms of the intellectual tradition of the
scientific community, the preunderstanding of the scientist herself.

Thomas Kuhn, Stephen Toulmin, R.G.Collingwood

the world described by science is in part always a historical construct, differing as the cultural
"minds" of different epochs and places differ. (60)

Reality and "scientific reality" are not identical: science is not a mirror of nature.

The findings of science historical documents, molded in part by the paradigms of their time

and place.

The thoughts humans think and the inquiries they make are historical,

Galileo, Berkley, Hume, Kant

that world of ordered sequences governed by necessary law is only the phenomenal world, a construct by human sense and by the human mind out of the given. As a consequence, the world so constructed, the world even of science, is not the "real" world, the "thing in itself" or noumenon. ... Critical philosophy did not completely sunder scientific knowledge and "reality," but it surely distinguished them --- and led many to think that the naive realism of pre-Kantian philosophy was at an end. (61)

This deep gulf of ignorance between critical philosophy and the spokespersons for modern science begs for an explanation.

批判哲学の再定式化の試み、intention

The tradition of critical philosophy has continued in much important philosophy into our own day. Hence it has, like science, been significantly transformed.

George Santayana, Alfred North Whitehead

they reformulated in more intelligible terms the Kantian distinction between the world of appearance and so of scientific theory, on the one hand, and the ontologically real world, the Ding an sich, on the other hand.

the realm of matter (Santayana), concrete actuality (Whitehead)

Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, and Paul Tillich each represented a parallel mode of distinguishing the world of science from what Husserl called the primordial life world.

Whitehead is impressed with what he likes to call the "abstract" character of the cosmos as described by modern science.

... does not fit with and so cannot be thought to undergird important and pervasive areas of common experience: social relations, courts of law, literature and art, commerce, morality, and so on. a world that is "quite unbelievable."

the two sensationalist dogma that only through sense data is reality known and that science alone therefore, gives indication of what is real, are false. There are other, more fundamental modes of experiencing, which are more directly in touch with actuality. These nonsensory perceptions are multiple.

the sense of "witness with the body" through which we are self-aware, or "know" ourselves as an organic unity; the sense of continuous and pervasive passage; and the sense of aims and of intentions for the immediate future.

Here actuality is itself experienced through our own participation in being the organic society we are, and this level of experience is rich in metaphysical implications. it is therefore through nonsensory experience that the reality, the "processing," the interconnectedness, and the order of experience in time are known; and it is this level of experience that, while beyond

science (nonsensory), provides the bases or presuppositions of science. (63)

形而上学の役割

metaphysics provides the theoretical framework (the "rationality") for science, which science by itself lacks.... it articulates into a coherent system the presuppositions for the special sciences. It provides a clearer, less abstract, more concrete, and more direct delineation of what is real and so the basis of our knowledge of the real. (63)

metaphysics can assess the cognitive value of each special mode of experiencing and knowing: the physical sciences, art, psychology, religion.

those factors crucial to all of experience

the universality of change, the pervasiveness of order, the continuity within time, the appearance of novelty, the importance of aims and values, the reality of purposes and responsibility, the grounds for hope.

These pervasive traits of experience can never be seen by the empirical method, for they are assumed and so are not noticed:

Civilization is utterly dependent on this faith in persuasive order and in value amid transience.

For Whitehead, then, while metaphysics will temper and limit the claims of the sciences described in these cosmologies, it will also provide the rational grounding that science needs; for metaphysics alone can ponder and articulate the structure of the whole, that unity of objects and subjects, of structure and meaning, of inquiring and the value of inquiry on which the science depend. (64)

修正された柔らかい批判哲学 批判的实在論・隠喩・現象学

If sensory experience and the science based on it are not isomorphic with the actualities so experienced and known, then at the least they can be said to be analogical. (69)

this abstracted account is analogical to the reality it portrays, (70)

Sense experience and science are analogical.

Here the critical philosophies that have been cited in this chapter depart from Kant to explore, by way of an "analogical metaphysics," the actuality from which science has abstracted signs.

The common methodological thread that guides Whitehead, Tillich, and Santayana out of the subjectivity of the Kantian maze is the notion of "participation." We know the reality through the senses and through science.... this external relation through the sense to the process that constitutes reality is not our only relation to that process. The process manifests itself in us, as well as in those objects "outside" of us. Further, this manifestations in us kindles our self-awareness: we are aware of our participation in existing, in being "real," in "being there," and in being immersed in change; and we are aware of our awareness, our consciousness. In us, "being" comes to self-awareness and self-consciousness (Tillich); (71)

We do know what it means to be ourselves and to be human. We are aware of our own being

from the inside. Hence human being is the gateway to being.

These inner experiences of being, causal efficacy(Whitehead)

The result is the possibility of a metaphysical discrimination of the structure of actuality as actuality appears in us,

a modest metaphysical analysis

Whitehead names this ground of assurance (the order that we uncover is an order also characteristic of actuality) "faith," a faith in the rationality of things. (72)