

1 宗教とは何か

1 - 1 : 古典的宗教哲学とその限界

1 - 2 : 意味論から宗教論へ

1 - 3 : 究極的関心・深みの次元・自己超越性

< Paul Tillich の宗教論 1 >

(1) 究極的関心としての信仰

(2) 意味の形而上学 - 意味意識・意味行為 -

(3) 生の現象学と宗教

(4) 広義と狭義の宗教概念

2 近代世界と宗教 - なぜ宗教か -2 - 1 : フォイエルバッハ問題

1. 現代キリスト教を規定する問いとしてのフォイエルバッハ問題
2. フォイエルバッハの宗教批判の二つの前提

人間の類的本質の無限性 類的本質の外化 (= 疎外、投影)
3. 「宗教は動物に対する人間の本質的な区別に基づいている - 動物は宗教を持たない」

個体としての自分や他者の意識 + 類的存在としての人間 (人間性) の意識
4. 人間の本質あるいは類 (あるいはいわゆる人間性): 理性、意志、心情
5. 類としての理性そのもの (種あるいは類としての人類) の無限性
6. 人間は自らの活動を通して自己を自分自身から区別された客体として措定する (外化あるいは疎外) 「対象の意識は人間の自己意識であり」、「対象は人間のあらわな本質であり、人間の真実にして客観的な自我である」
9. 「他者は私の汝であり……私の他なる自我である。それは私にとって対象化された人間、私の顕わにされた内面である。すなわち他者は自分自身を見る目である。私は他者においてはじめて人間性の意識をもつ。他者を通してはじめて、私は私が人間であることを経験し感じるのである」
10. 「宗教は無限者の意識である。したがって宗教は人間が自らの無限の本質についてもつ意識であり、かつそれ以外の何ものでも在り得ない」。「神の意識は人間の自己意識であり、神認識は人間の自己認識である」
11. 「神は人間の鏡である」、「神学の秘密は人間学である」
12. 宗教: 人間の本質を人間の外に存在する超越的なもの (= 神) として措定 偶像崇拜

「神を富ませるために、人間は貧しくならねばならない」、「神が主体的であればあるほど、人間はよりいっそう自分の主体性を疎外する」
13. 哲学の課題: このような神と人間の対立が類的本質としての人間と個人としての人間の対立であることを暴露することであり、人間から疎外された人間性を人間の側に取り戻すことなのである
14. フォイエルバッハによって批判された神

人間の類的本質の無限性の根拠

現代の宗教的神学的思想は人間の疎外の克服、人間の本来的可能性の実現について
フォイルバッハの宗教批判 マルクス的な無神論的な宗教批判(非宗教的宗教批判)
キルケゴール的な有神論的な宗教批判(宗教的宗教批判)

2 - 2 : 現代神学とフォイエルバッハ

(1) フォイエルバッハの宗教批判の系譜

<マルクス>

<フロイト>

(2) キリスト教神学におけるフォイエルバッハ問題

<バルト>

1. バルト神学の基本的立場

1. 19世紀の近代社会に埋没したキリスト教とその神学(自由主義神学)に対する徹底的な批判とそれによるキリスト教の本来の在り方の取り戻し
2. 神と人間との絶対的な質的差異、神の下における人間の危機
3. 宗教社会主義運動(スイス)、弁証法神学(危機神学、新正統主義、神の言の神学)
4. 30年代以降: ナチス・ドイツ的キリスト者に対する教会闘争を指導・バルメン宣言

2. 宗教批判への応答

5. 宗教と啓示との峻別

宗教: 神・救済へ向かおうとする人間的努力 = 自己救済の試み、不信仰としての宗教

3. バルト神学の評価

- (1) フォイエルバッハの宗教批判へのキリスト教神学からの応答の典型
- (2) 近代のキリスト教とその神学の問題性を鋭く捉え、キリスト教と神学の固有性を再確認した。神学にはその固有の論理と方法がある。
- (3) フォイエルバッハの宗教批判に十分に答えたことになるのか
- (4) 宗教は不信仰な人間的努力という評価は、キリスト教の自己批判としてはわかるとしても、他の諸宗教を一方的にいっしょくたんに扱うのは正当なやり方と言えるか。バルトの立場からは、他の宗教との対話などあり得ない。

<ティリッヒ>

<パネンベルク>

<ヒック>

<ポイント>

・投影理論にどのように答えるか。

宗教的実在の实在性をどのように理解し説明するかが、争点となる。

・宗教的実在論の問題へ

・宗教言語の問題へ、隠喩理論

2 - 3 : 宗教的实在論

- 1 . 素朴实在論 / 批判主義 / 非实在論 / 批判的实在論
科学と宗教との並行関係
- 2 . 超自然主義 / 自然主義 / 批判的宗教論
神・究極的实在と人間との絶対的差異とは何か。
自然主義による批判の真理性：神は物ではない
自然主義の限界：神は単なる投影・幻想ではない
- 3 . 宗教批判としての批判主義・非实在論・自然主義

宗教批判の問題は、宗教的实在論とそれに対する批判として捉えることができる。

宗教批判と宗教的实在論の問題を、言語論として捉えること。

- 4 . 宗教言語の意味 (Sinn, meaning) と指示 (Bedeutung, reference)
- 5 . 宗教言語、とくに隠喩表現 (「神は父である」、あるいはテキストレベルでのイエスの譬え) の指示の問題として論じること。
- 6 . 宗教言語・隠喩は、自己指示的 (指示が存在しない) あるいは情動の表出である。
宗教言語は指示を持ちうるか。

第一度の指示と第二度の指示の区別。

内的現実と外的現実との相関に基づく第二度の指示の開示
単なる外的实在でも単なる主観的な幻想でもなく、相関においてそのつど生成し共同体において共有される現実

< 現代言語論における隠喩 >

Michael A. Arbib and Mary B. Hesse

The Construction of Reality, Cambridge University Press 1986

(1) 区別 1 : 伝統的古典的な言語論

隠喩は、指示機能を有しない (現実について語らない)、真理には関わらない、装飾的宗教言語は、主観的・情動的

rejection of the literalist view of language as an ideal static system with fixed meanings

Metaphors have as such no truth value and therefore no cognitive value in expressing knowledge of the world.

to suggest on the contrary that metaphor after all has cognitive status is to question the grounds of most of applied logic and semantics. Nevertheless, if we are to make any sense of most everyday speech, let alone the language of ideology and religion, we must give some cognitive status to metaphor. (148)

To understand the connection between scientific realism, the positivist theory of knowledge, and the literalist view of language, we need to go back to the seventeenth-century scientific revolution and beyond that to Aristotle. Much of Aristotelian philosophy was discredited and

explicitly rejected by the pioneers of modern science, but his theory of language remained essentially unscathed. In the seventeenth century, the rise of science was accompanied by the conception of an "ideal language"..... The metaphor of "two books" is pervasive:

Bacon: *Natural and Experimental History*

Leibniz: *characteristica universalis*

cf. Umberto Eco, *La ricerca della lingua perfetta nella cultura europea*

Roma-Bari, Laterza 1993

The notion of an ideal language perfectly reflecting the world has a philosophical pedigree going back at least to Aristotle.

Aristotelian world in which all objects and events fall into complexes of a finite (though perhaps very large) number of fixed species or natural kinds. This is exactly the world Aristotle adopted for his ontology...

nature as a treelike hierarchy of species and genera (149)

The theory of the ideal language and the ideal science fits this ontology like a glove. Any language contains in practice a finite number of general terms, and an ideal language contains enough for them to "mirror" the fixed number of natural kinds that are to be made isomorphic with them in the ideal science. ... This program for both language and science was the seventeenth-century dream, which still maintains its hold under the guise of the correspondence theory of truth, The seventeenth-century myth has conspired with the nineteenth-century dream of a universal logic... (150)

formal analysis of language in terms of precise and stable meanings. In this formal analysis, metaphoric uses of words are in some way improper or deviant. If metaphor is to be taken seriously, it implies changing meanings; in a literalist theory, however, there is no room for understanding metaphor as implying continual shifts of meaning, because literal meanings are either constant, that is univocal, or equivocal. (150)

(2) 類似 (ブラック、ヘッセ/リクール/レイコフ、瀬戸)

隠喩の認知機能・現実の再記述、隠喩的真理

発見的機能、世界の見方を教える (これまでとは別様に)

We are going to argue for a nonliteralist theory of meaning and metaphor compatible with an account of language as rooted in schemas. Specially, we argue for the thesis that "all language is metaphorical." (150)

Lying behind this notion of "proper" and "improper" application of terms, and behind almost all subsequent discussion of metaphor, is an Aristotelian philosophy of universals. Universals are the correlates in reality of the "proper" use of universal terms; it is therefore at this level that the significance of metaphor must be analyzed. An alternative to the Aristotelian theory of universals can be found in Wittgenstein's (1953) account of "family resemblances"(FR)... Here, objects may form a class to whose members a predicate P is correctly ascribed, without assuming that there is any universal "P-ness" realized by each other. Instead, we assume that in an FR class,...

the members of enough pairs of objects in the class resemble each other in some respects relevant to P so these resemblances can form, as it were, a chainlike structure through the class in such a way that there are relatively clear cases of objects falling within the class and relatively clear cases of those that do not. ... Wittgenstein argued from ordinary usage that there are such cases of irreducible FR. (151)

Contrary to Aristotle's belief, no two particular objects or events share exactly the same properties, whether these are called "essential" or "accidental," and indeed this distinction is a false one. Locke General terms are necessary, but their use entails some loss of information about the world. (151)

Understood in terms of this FR analysis, metaphorical shifts of meaning depending on similarities and differences between objects are pervasive in language, not deviant, and some of the mechanisms of metaphor are essential to the meaning of any descriptive language whatever. This is what is meant here by the thesis that "all language is metaphorical." (152)

The thesis that all language is metaphorical rejects this classical analysis to highlight the fact that explicit use of metaphor and simile are themselves based on the most fundamental linguistic fact of all --- namely, that linguistic reference always depends on perceived similarities and differences. ... metonymy (parts/whole, effects/causes) ... We assume that "all language is metaphorical" in a fundamental sense that underlies all meaning tropes; but this is only the beginning of our problems. (153)

Our starting point is Max Black's interaction theory of metaphor as modified in the light of Wittgenstein's FR. We use the term meaning loosely as an inclusive term for reference, use, and the relevant set of what Black calls the "associated commonplace" ... called up by metaphoric usage. (154)

We saw that if "truth" is understood in the sense of ideal correspondence and if it has the meaning in propositional logic, then metaphorical utterance are effectively equivocal in meaning, have no truth value, and do not permit deductive inference. But we have abandoned strict correspondence and deduction, except as special limiting bases; it thus remains to find a new sense of "truth" more adequate to the new view of meaning and language. (154-155)

the use of metaphor in language has the functions not only of extending meaning and defining new meanings but also of the interaction and redescription of domains already seen through one metaphor frame in terms of another. Such redescription can have disruptive effects on previously complacent ways of looking at the world.

Lakoff and Johnson: "Argument is war"

extended metaphor: Your claims are indefensible. He attacked every weak point in my argument. His criticisms were right on target.

To philosophers, this may seem the only natural and "correct" way of talking about argument, but it depends on metaphor just as the first example did and is equally revealing of a certain set of value judgements about what argument is.

Contrast another metaphor, equally familiar in modern context: "Argument is negotiation," with its accompanying

Metaphor is potentially revolutionary. (155-156)

In such cases, the question "Which metaphor is true ?" cannot expect a single or simple answer. There is no "fact" to which "argument" corresponds that has the natural character of "war" or "logic" or "negotiation." The extended metaphors are not in that sense true or false but are appropriate or inappropriate, more or less revealing, more or less useful, depending on the context of application and their coherence with evaluative judgements made about particular situation. (156)

Metaphor causes us to "see" the phenomena differently and causes the meaning of terms that are relatively observational and literal in the original system to shift toward the metaphoric meaning. ... In terms of the metaphor, we can find and express deeper analogies between diverse phenomena; or, of course, in the case of bad metaphors we may find we are misled by them. (156)

This interaction view of theoretical models is compatible with the thesis that observations are theory laden. It entails the abandonment of the a two-tiered account of language in which some observational uses are irreducibly literal and invariant with respect to all changes of the language and content of explanatory theory. The interaction view sees all language, including the scientific, as dynamic. (156-157)

(3) 区別 2

- ・ 宗教的実在とは如何なるリアリティか
常に新しくあるために、古い地平を絶えず越えてゆく推進力としての宗教的実在
究極的目的の具体的提示・神の国
- ・ 現実の見方と関連した自己のあり方の転換、つまり救済的機能

In the metaphorical view, logical consistency is no longer at the heart of language. Rather, as we in our discussion of Piaget, the reconciliation of logical discrepancies assumes a driving role for change of meaning; similarly in science, we reconfigure both theory and observation language to allow us to describe and explain a wider range of phenomena. This does not mean, however, that the metaphoric view entails abandonment of logic and deduction in science. Indeed, we may see this as chief distinction between use of metaphor in science and in poetry. Good poetic metaphors are initially striking, unexpected, and perhaps shocking. They extend and ramify by association and analogy not by logic..... Scientific metaphor, on the other side, may be initially unexpected; once established as useful, however, they are extended and developed by logic as well as by analogy. They are meant to be internally tightly knit by logical and causal interrelations. (157)

We found reason to reject both assumptions. Implied classifications and analogies can only be stated in a language containing some other implied classifications and analogies. Reality is never exactly captured in explicit speech. This is not, however, a nonempirical idealism because it does not deny that there is a real structure in the world, of which science progressively exhibits more as it learns more about the natural environment by the feedback method of the pragmatic criterion.

Nor does it ascribe a strong realism to scientific theory because science does not capture this structure in a detailed isomorphism of true categories and true statements with the world.

Scientific theory provides constructed models of scientific reality that are distinguished from other types of social and poetic construction by being constrained by feedback loops involving experimentation in the natural world. (159)

Scientific models are a prototype, philosophically speaking, for imaginative creations or schemas based on natural language and experience, but they go beyond it by metaphorical extension to construct symbolic worlds that may or may not adequately represent certain aspects of the empirical world. These symbolic worlds all share with scientific models the function of describing and redescribing the world; and for all of them it is inappropriate to ask for literal truth as direct correspondence with the world. Symbolic worlds differ from scientific models, however, in that it is not their function to represent the state of the natural environment for purposes of prediction and control. As their functions differ, so their means of validation will also be expected to be different. (161)

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