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Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness*, 1944

The thesis of this volume grew out of my conviction that democracy has a more compelling justification and requires a more realistic vindication than is given it by the liberal culture with which it has been associated in modern history. The excessively optimistic estimates of human nature and of human history with which the democratic credo has been historically associated are a source of peril to democratic society;

A free society requires some confidence in the ability of men to reach tentative and tolerable adjustments between their competing interests and to arrive at some common notions of justice which transcend all partial interests. （xii）

But modern democracy requires a more realistic philosophical and religious basis, not only in order to anticipate and understand the peril to which it is exposed; but also to give it a more persuasive justification. （xiii）

It will be apparent, however, that they are informed by the belief that a Christian view of human nature is more adequate for the development of a democratic society than either the optimism with which democracy has become historically associated or the moral cynicism which inclines human communities to tyrannical political strategies. (xv)

Democracy, as every other historic ideal and institution, contains both ephemeral and more permanently valid elements. Democracy is on the one hand the characteristic fruit of a bourgeois civilization; on the other hand it is a perenially valuable form of social organization in which freedom and order are made to support, and not to contradict, each other.

Democracy is a "bourgeois ideology" in so far as it expresses the typical viewpoints of the middle classes who have risen to power in European civilization in the past three or four centuries. （1）

the fact that it has a deeper dimension and broader validity than its middle-class character. Ideally democracy is a permanently valid form of social and political organization which does justice to two dimensions of human existence: to man's spiritual stature and his social character; to the uniqueness and variety of life, as well as to the common necessities of all men.

Democracy can not be equated with freedom. An ideal democratic order seeks unity within the

conditions of freedom; and maintains freedom within the framework of order. (3)

   In illumining this important distinction more fully, we may well designate the moral cynics, who know no law beyond their will and interest, with a scriptural designation of "children of this world" or "children of darkness." Those who believe that self-interest should be brought under the discipline of a higher law could then be termed "the children of light." (9)

   evil is always the assertion of some self-interest without regard to the whole. .... The good is, on the other hand, always the harmony of the whole on various levels. Devotion to a subordinate and premature "whole" such as the nation, may of course become evil, viewed from the perspective of a larger whole, such as the community of mankind. The "children of light" may thus be defined as those who seek to bring self-interest under the discipline of a more universal law and in harmony with a more universal good. (9-10)

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Paul Tillich, *Systematic Theology. Volume One, Two. Three*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951,1957,1963

1990, 1969,1984

[   ] Tillich, Paul 1886-1965

1960

1960

Message / Situation

Apologetic Theology / Kerygmatic Theology

System

Sources / Experience / Norm / Method
The Method of Correlation
     Question / Answer
         Situation   Philosophy / Theology   Message
     The Theological Circle

		Question	Answer
Vol.1	Introduction		
	Part I	Reason	Revelation
	Part II	Being	God
Vol.2	Part III	Existence	Christ
Vol.3	Part IV	Life	Spirit
	Part V	History	Kingdom of God

Being / Existence / Life   History
God / Christ / Spirit   Trinity
Creation / History / Eschaton   Eternity   History of Salvation

Ronald Stone, *Paul Tillich's radical social thought*, John Knox Press   1980.

The meaning of the term "world" in the context of this and the preceding chapters is

determined by its contrast to the terms "church" and "the churches." It does not imply the belief that there is a world history which is a coherent and continuous history of the all-embracing historical group "mankind." As discussed before, there is no history of mankind in this sense. Mankind is the place on which historical developments occur. These developments are partly unconnected and partly interdependent, but they never have a united center of action. Even today, when a technical unity of mankind has been achieved, no centered action by mankind as such is being performed. (382)

Power and Justice

In the communal realm, too, the gap between subject and object leads to a great number of ambiguities.

The justice of social cohesion implies the injustice of social rejection. ... The ambiguity of cohesion and rejection is conquered by the creation of more embracing unities, through which those who are rejected by the unavoidable exclusiveness of any concrete group are included in a large group --- finally in mankind.

Justice implies equality; but equality of what is essentially unequal is as unjust as inequality of what is essentially equal. (262)

The ultimate equality, however, cannot be separated from the existential inequality. ... With the affirmation of the ultimate equality of all men, the Spiritual Presence affirms the polarity of relative equality and relative inequality in the actual communal life. (263)

Because of the lack of a physiological centeredness such as we find in the individual person, the community must create centeredness, as far as it is possible at all, by a ruling group. ... The ambiguities of justice which follow from this character of communal centeredness are rooted in the unavoidable fact that the ruler and the ruling group actualize their own power of being when they actualize the power of being of the whole community they represent. The tyranny... (263)

the members of the ruling group (including the ruler) are able to sacrifice their subjectivity in part by becoming objects of their own rule along with all other objects and by transferring the sacrificed part of their subjectivity to the ruled. This partial sacrifice of the subjectivity of the rulers and this partial elevation of the ruled to subjectivity is the meaning of the "democratic" idea. It is not identical with any particular democratic constitution which attempts to actualize the democratic principle. This principle is an element in the Spiritual Community and its justice. (264)

As stated before, democracy is not an absolute political system, but it is the best way discovered so far to guarantee the creative freedom of determining the historical process to everyone within a centered historical group. ... Democracy makes it possible to fight for freedom in all realms which contribute to the historical movement by fighting for freedom in the political realm. Nevertheless, the participation of the individual in the democratic systems of politics is not without limits and ambiguities. .... The channels of public communication in the hands of ruling

groups can become instruments of a conformity which kills creativity in all realms as successfully as under dictatorships, the realm of politics being the chief example. (347)

In so far as democratization of political attitudes institutions serves to resist the destructive implications of power, it is a manifestation of the Kingdom of God in history. But it would be completely wrong to identify democratic institutions with the Kingdom of God in history. (385)

The way in which the Kingdom of God works in history is not identical with the way the churches want to direct the course of history. (386)

It is the nature of democratic institutions, in relation to questions of political centeredness and of political growth, that they try to unite the truth of the two conflicting sides. The two sides here are the new and the old, represented by revolution and tradition. .... And we must not forget that democracy can produce a mass conformity which is more dangerous for the dynamic element in history and its revolutionary expression than is openly working absolutism. (389)

(1)

(2)