

キリスト教思想における社会・政治・民族（１）

１ キリスト教思想と政治

１ 近代世界とキリスト教

２ 民主主義とキリスト教

２ - １：キリスト教と政治

１．大木英夫「デモクラシーとキリスト教」

キリスト教はあらゆる政治体制と結合できる、しかしデモクラシーへの近さ

R. Niebuhr, *Christian Realism and Political Problems*, Faber & Faber Limited, 1953.

For a long time a debate has been waged between Christian and secular leaders on the question whether democracy is the product of the Christian faith or of a secular culture. The debate has been inconclusive because, as a matter of history, both Christian and secular forces were involved in establishing the political institutions of democracy; and the cultural resources of modern free societies are jointly furnished by both Christianity and modern secularism. (94)

But there is a strong affinity at one point between democracy and Christianity: the toleration which democracy requires is difficult to maintain without Christian humility; and the challenges to pretensions of every kind which are furnished in the give and take of democratic life are, on the other hand, strong external supports for the Christian grace of humility which recognizes the partial and particular character of everyone's interest and the fragmentary character of every human virtue. (101)

２．歴史的事実としての多様な関係性と理念における親近性

イエスの宗教運動、徹底的な平等主義 現実の妥協か現実の変革か

H.R.Niebuhr, *Christ against Culture*, *Christ of Culture*

３．イデオロギーとユートピア、第三の道、信仰的現実主義 (Glaubiger Realismus)

２ - ２：近代民主主義の形成過程

<これまでの議論から>

・いつから近代化、また近代はどのような段階を経て展開してきたか。

宗教（キリスト教）との関連から見て、近代・モダンに、１７世紀中葉以前と以後での段階を設定し、また、１９世紀の末以前と以後とを区分する。

近代・モダニティは再帰的な未完のプロセスであり、モダニティから、それ以降は生じない（ポスト・モダンという逆説）

・モダンとは伝統的・封建的な社会システムのシステム変動によって生成した社会システムの全体性。

モダンは、地域によって（１７世紀中葉から１８世紀にかけてイギリスで典型的に

成立し、後にグローバル化によって世界規模で進展しつつある社会システム)、また社会システムのどのサブシステムに注目するかで、その進展の速度や特徴が異なっている。科学(啓蒙的な実証主義的科学)、資本主義(市場経済)、民主主義(議会制、立憲制、信教の自由と政教分離)。

(1) 宗教改革と徹底的な平等主義 近代世界の前提

(2) 近代民主主義とキリスト教

・イギリス国教会とピューリタン

・近代民主主義の母体としてのピューリタンの教会会議、パトニー会議

・「同意の原理」

・「討論の原理」

10. 「集いの意識」(the sense of the meeting) 下からの公共性

神によって集められた契約共同体

アレントにおける革命評議会論

11. 自由な討論を保障するシステム 政教分離の原則、市民社会の宗教の原則

Anthony Giddens, *Beyond Left and Right. The Future of Radical Politics*, Polity Press 1994.

What is democracy?

A starting point for considering these issues is offered by what some have recently started to call 'deliberative democracy' - and have specifically contrasted to liberal democracy. Liberal democracy is a set of representative institutions, guided by certain values; deliberative democracy is a way of getting, or trying to get, agreement about policies in the political arena. The deliberative ideal, according to David Miller, for example, 'starts from the premise that political preferences will conflict and that the purpose of democratic institutions must be to resolve this conflict'. For such conflict resolution to be democratic, he says, echoing Jurgen Habermas, it must occur 'through an open and uncoerced discussion of the issue at stake with the aim of arriving at an agreed judgement'. It does not have to be the case that agreement is reached directly through such discussion. A vote might be taken; the important thing is that the participants reach a judgement on the basis of what they have heard and said. (113)

森村 進『自由はどこまで可能か リバタリアニズム入門』講談社現代新書 2001年。

2 - 3 : 民主主義の両義性 R . ニーバー

Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness*, 1944

The thesis of this volume grew out of my conviction that democracy has a more compelling justification and requires a more realistic vindication than is given it by the liberal culture with which it has been associated in modern history. The excessively optimistic estimates of human nature and of human history with which the democratic credo has been historically associated are a source of peril to democratic society;

A free society requires some confidence in the ability of men to reach tentative and tolerable

adjustments between their competing interests and to arrive at some common notions of justice which transcend all partial interests. (xii)

But modern democracy requires a more realistic philosophical and religious basis, not only in order to anticipate and understand the peril to which it is exposed; but also to give it a more persuasive justification. (xiii)

It will be apparent, however, that they are informed by the belief that a Christian view of human nature is more adequate for the development of a democratic society than either the optimism with which democracy has become historically associated or the moral cynicism which inclines human communities to tyrannical political strategies. (xv)

Democracy, as every other historic ideal and institution, contains both ephemeral and more permanently valid elements. Democracy is on the one hand the characteristic fruit of a bourgeois civilization; on the other hand it is a perennially valuable form of social organization in which freedom and order are made to support, and not to contradict, each other.

Democracy is a "bourgeois ideology" in so far as it expresses the typical viewpoints of the middle classes who have risen to power in European civilization in the past three or four centuries. (1)

Since bourgeois civilization, which came to birth in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries and reached its zenith in the nineteenth century, is now obviously in grave peril, (2)

the fact that it has a deeper dimension and broader validity than its middle-class character. Ideally democracy is a permanently valid form of social and political organization which does justice to two dimensions of human existence: to man's spiritual stature and his social character; to the uniqueness and variety of life, as well as to the common necessities of all men.

Democracy can not be equated with freedom. An ideal democratic order seeks unity within the conditions of freedom; and maintains freedom within the framework of order.(3)

The inadequacy of the presuppositions upon which the democratic experiment rests does not consist merely in the excessive individualism and libertarianism of the bourgeois world view.(6)

But there is a more fundamental error in the social philosophy of democratic civilization than the individualism of bourgeois democracy and the collectivism of Marxism. It is the confidence of both bourgeois and proletarian idealists in the possibility of achieving an easy resolution of the tension and conflict between self-interest and the general interest.

the social idealism which informs our democratic civilization had a touching faith in the possibility of achieving a simple harmony between self-interest and the general welfare on every level.(7)

In illumining this important distinction more fully, we may well designate the moral cynics, who know no law beyond their will and interest, with a scriptural designation of "children of this world" or "children of darkness." Those who believe that self-interest should be brought under the discipline of a higher law could then be termed "the children of light." (9)

evil is always the assertion of some self-interest without regard to the whole. The good is,

on the other hand, always the harmony of the whole on various levels. Devotion to a subordinate and premature "whole" such as the nation, may of course become evil, viewed from the perspective of a larger whole, such as the community of mankind. The "children of light" may thus be defined as those who seek to bring self-interest under the discipline of a more universal law and in harmony with a more universal good. (9-10)

Our democratic civilization has been built, not by children of darkness but by foolish children of light. ... The children of light have not been as wise as the children of darkness.

The children of darkness are evil because they know no law beyond the self. They are wise, though evil, because they understand the power of self-interest. The children of light are virtuous because they have some conception of a higher law than their own will. They are usually foolish because they do not know the power of self-will. They underestimate the peril of anarchy in both the national and the international community. Modern democratic civilization is, in short, sentimental rather than cynical. It has an easy solution for the problem of anarchy and chaos on both the national and international level of community, because of its fatuous and superficial view of man. (10-11)

Its advantage lay not merely in its own lack of moral scruple but also in its shrewd assessment of the power of self-interest, individual and national, among the children of light, despite their moral protestations. (11)

While our modern children of light, the secularized idealists, were particularly foolish and blind, the more "Christian" children of light have been almost equally guilty of this error. (12)

It was a conflict between pious and less pious children of light, both of whom were unconscious of the corruption of self-interest in all ideal achievement and pretensions of human culture. (15)

Our modern civilization, on the other hand, was ushered in on a wave of boundless social optimism. Modern secularism is divided into many schools. But all the various schools agreed in rejecting the Christian doctrine of original sin. ... the lack of which has robbed bourgeois theory of real wisdom; for it emphasizes a fact which every page of human history attests. (16)

This sober and true view of the human situation was neatly rejected by modern culture. ... no school asks how it is that an essentially good man could have produced corrupting and tyrannical political organizations or exploiting economic organizations, or fanatical and superstitious religious organizations. (17)

The confidence of modern secular idealism in the possibility of an easy resolution of the tension between individual and community, or between classes, races and nations is derived from a too optimistic view of human nature. This too generous estimate of human virtue (18)

The one form is the desire to fulfill the potentialities of life and not merely to maintain its existence. (19)

the will-to-live is also spiritually transformed into the will-to-power or into the desire for "power and glory." (20)

Since the survival impulse in nature is transformed into two different and contradictory spiritualized forms, which we may briefly designate as the will-to-live-truly and the will-to-power,

man is at variance with himself. (21)

One must therefore, in analyzing the liberal hope of a simple social and political harmony, be equally aware of the universalistic presuppositions which underlie the hope and of the egoistic corruptions (both individual and collective) which inevitably express themselves in our culture in terms of, and in despite of, the creed. One must understand that it is a creed of children of light; but also that it betrays their blindness to the forces of darkness. (24)

Adam Smith

Smith's secularized version of providence

This "invisible hand" is the power of pre-established social harmony.

which transmutes conflict of self-interest into a vast scheme of mutual service. (25)

It must be noted that in Smith's conception the "wider interest" does not stop at the boundary of the national state. His was a real universalism in interest. Smith clearly belongs to the children of light. But the children of darkness were able to make good use of his creed. His vision of international harmony was transmuted into the sorry realities of an international capitalism which recognized neither moral scruples nor political restraints in expanding its power over the world. (26)

The general confidence of an identity between self-interest and the commonweal, which underlies liberal democratic political theory, is succinctly expressed in Thomas Paine's simple creed: "Public good is not a term opposed to the good of the individual;" While there is a sense in which this identity between a particular and the general interest is ultimately true, it is never absolutely true in an immediate situation; ... (28)

The Marxists, too, are children of light. The provisional cynicism does not even save them from the usual stupidity, nor from the fate, of other stupid children of light. The fate is to have their creed become the vehicle and instrument of the children of darkness. A new oligarchy is arising in Russia, ... in the light of history Stalin will probably have the same relation to the early dreamers of the Marxist dreams which Napoleon has to the liberal dreamers of the eighteenth century. (33)

Fichte, too, was a universalist who was fully conscious of moral obligations which transcend the national community. His difficulty, like that of all the children of light, was that he had a too easy resolution of the conflict between the nation and the community of nations. He was, in other words, one of the many stupid children of light, who failed to understand the difficulty of the problem which he was considering; (37-38)

Hegel, too, belongs to the children of light. To be sure he saw little possibility of constructing a legal structure of universal proportions which might guard the interests of the universal community and place a check upon the will of nations. Hegel imagined that the nation, free of political but not of moral inhibitions, could nevertheless, by thinking "in Weltgeschichte", thereby "lay hold of its concrete universality." ... It is the error of a too great reliance upon the human capacity for transcendence over self-interest. There is indeed such a capacity. ... But the same man who displays this capacity also reveals varying degrees of the power of self-interest and of the subservience of the mind to these interests. ... sometimes it (this egotism) uses the ideal as its

instrument.(39-40)

it has also become necessary to distinguish what is false in democratic theory from what is true in democratic life.

The preservation of a democratic civilization requires the wisdom of the serpent and the harmlessness of the dove.(40)

It must be observed, however, that if the difference in practice between national collectivists and Marxists is not always very great, the difference in theory is immense. The similarity in practice arises from the fact that a dictatorship, which according to the theory is to be only provisional, becomes permanent. The difference in theory is that Marxism really desires a perfect harmony between the individual and the community. (58)

Every society needs working principles of justice, as criteria for its positive law and system of restraints. The profoundest of these actually transcend reason and lie rooted in religious conceptions of the meaning of existence. But every historical statement of them is subject to amendment. If it becomes fixed it will destroy some of the potentialities of a higher justice... . (71)

<文献>

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